

# Faster Isogeny-Based Compressed Key Agreement

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# REVIEW: SIDH AND COMPRESSED KEYS

# Isogeny-based Crypto

- SIDH: proposed replacement for DH-based elliptic curves in a post-quantum world.
- Smallest post-quantum public keys (< 200 bytes)
  - boosted by key compression techniques
  - applications with low bandwidth requirements
- Downside:
  - $\approx 2$  order of magnitude slower than FourQ-based DH or other fast post-quantum KEM schemes (NewHope/NTRU).

# SIDH Parameter Setting

- $p = 2^m \cdot 3^n - 1$  for post-quantum sec. level  $\approx 128$  bits
  - Previous: 751-bit prime for  $m = 372, n = 239$
  - [2018] Adj *et al.* suggest  $\approx 448$ -bit primes are enough

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- $E_0/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} : By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$  a supersingular Montgomery curve of order  $(p + 1)^2 = 2^{2m}3^{2n}$ 
  - $\langle P_A, Q_A \rangle = E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})[2^m], \langle P_B, Q_B \rangle = E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})[3^n]$

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- $E_0/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} : By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$  a supersingular Montgomery curve of order  $(p + 1)^2 = 2^{2m}3^{2n}$ 
  - $\langle P_A, Q_A \rangle = E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})[2^m], \langle P_B, Q_B \rangle = E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})[3^n]$
- User private key:  $s \in_R \mathbb{Z}/\ell^e\mathbb{Z}$  for  $\ell \in \{2,3\}, e \in \{m,n\}$
- User public key: curve  $\mathbf{E}_{A,B} = \phi(E_0)$  and points  $\phi(\mathbf{P}), \phi(\mathbf{Q}) \in E_{A,B}$ .

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- Goal: transmit public key  $\{E_{A,B}, \phi(P), \phi(Q)\}$

Alice



Bob



$$E_{A,B}/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2011] Jao et al.'s public key representation:

Alice



$$A, B, x_{\phi(P)}, x_{\phi(Q)} \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$$

Pub. Key size:  $8 \log p$  bits

Bob



$$E_{A,B}/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}: \mathbf{B}y^2 = x^3 + \mathbf{A}x^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2016] Azarderakhsh et al.'s key compression:

Alice



$j(E_{A,B})$

Bob



$$E_{A,B}/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

$$E_{A',B'} \leftarrow j(E_{A,B})$$

isomorphic curve

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Alice



Bob



$j(E_{A,B}) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ :  **$2 \log p$**  bits

VS

$A, B \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ :  **$4 \log p$**  bits

**$2 \log p$**  bits saved

$E_{A,B}/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$

$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$

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$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

There is a canonical basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$  such that

$$\langle R_1, R_2 \rangle = E_{A,B}[3^n]$$

Idea: express

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \phi(P) &= a_1R_1 + a_2R_2 \\ \phi(Q) &= b_1R_1 + b_2R_2 \end{aligned} \right\}$$

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Linear algebra tasks  
- Build a *basis*

Idea: express

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \phi(P) = a_1R_1 + a_2R_2 \\ \phi(Q) = b_1R_1 + b_2R_2 \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{- Internal product: } \textit{pairing} \\ \text{- Coeff. extraction: } \textit{DLOG} \end{array}$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2016] Azarderakhsh et al.'s key compression:

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Bob



$j(E_{A,B})$



$$E_{A,B}/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$
$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

Compression (1/3):

- find a basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$

$$\phi(P) = a_1R_1 + a_2R_2$$

$$\phi(Q) = b_1R_1 + b_2R_2$$

Find  $R_1, R_2$ :

Expensive scalar multiplications involved

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2016] Azarderakhsh et al.'s key compression:

Alice



Bob



$j(E_{A,B})$



$$E_{A,B}/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$
$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

Compression (2/3):

- prepare DLOG instances
- Cost: 5 pairings

$$\phi(P) = a_1R_1 + a_2R_2$$

$$\phi(Q) = b_1R_1 + b_2R_2$$

$$\mathbf{g} = \mathbf{e}_{3^n}(\mathbf{R}_1, \mathbf{R}_2)$$

$$\mathbf{g}_0 = \mathbf{e}_{3^n}(\mathbf{R}_1, \phi(P))$$

$$\mathbf{g}_1 = \mathbf{e}_{3^n}(\mathbf{R}_2, \phi(P))$$

$$\mathbf{g}_2 = \mathbf{e}_{3^n}(\mathbf{R}_1, \phi(Q))$$

$$\mathbf{g}_3 = \mathbf{e}_{3^n}(\mathbf{R}_2, \phi(Q))$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2016] Azarderakhsh et al.'s key compression:

Alice



Bob



$j(E_{A,B})$



$$E_{A,B}/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

Compression (3/3):

- Compute  $a_i$ 's and  $b_i$ 's
- Cost: 4 order  $3^n$  DLOGs (Pohlig-Hellman)

$$\phi(P) = a_1R_1 + a_2R_2$$

$$\phi(Q) = b_1R_1 + b_2R_2$$

$$a_1 = -\log_g g_1$$

$$a_2 = \log_g g_0$$

$$b_1 = -\log_g g_3$$

$$b_2 = \log_g g_2$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2016] Azarderakhsh et al.'s key compression:

Alice



$$j(E_{A,B})$$
$$\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{3^n}$$



Bob



$$E_{A,B}/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

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
$j(E_{A,B})$

$a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2 \in (\mathbb{Z}_{3^n})^4$ :  **$2 \log p$**  bits

Vs

$x_{\phi(P)}, x_{\phi(Q)} \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ :  **$4 \log p$**  bits

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$j(E_{A,B})$   
 $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2$



Bob



$$E_{A,B}/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$
$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E_{A,B}$$

Decompression

- Compute  $\langle R_1, R_2 \rangle = E_{A',B'}[3^n]$
- Recover points:

$$\phi(P) \leftarrow \mathbf{a}_1 R_1 + \mathbf{a}_2 R_2$$

$$\phi(Q) \leftarrow \mathbf{b}_1 R_1 + \mathbf{b}_2 R_2$$

- Cost: 4 scalar muls.

# SIDH Public Key Compression

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$$j(E_{A,B}) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}: \mathbf{2 \log p \text{ bits}}$$

$$a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{3^n}: \mathbf{2 \log p \text{ bits}}$$

VS

$$A, B \in F_{p^2}: \mathbf{4 \log p \text{ bits}}$$

$$x(\phi(P)), x(\phi(Q)): \mathbf{4 \log p \text{ bits}}$$

Bob



Public key size: **4 log p** bits

- Keys shrunk by 2x 😊
- Compression time > **10x** KEX 😞

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2017] Costello et al. key compression:

Alice



$j(E_{A,B})$   
 ~~$a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2$~~

Bob



$$E/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E$$

Further compression

- Bob recovers  $\phi(P), \phi(Q)$  to compute the kernel

$$K = \langle \phi(P) + s_B \phi(Q) \rangle$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2017] Costello et al. key compression:

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$j(E_{A,B})$   
 ~~$a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2$~~

Bob



$$E/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E$$

Further compression

- After recovering  $\phi(P), \phi(Q)$ , Bob computes the kernel

$$\begin{aligned} K &= \langle \phi(P) + s_B \phi(Q) \rangle \\ &= \langle a_1 + s_B b_1 \rangle R_1 + \langle a_2 + s_B b_2 \rangle R_2 \end{aligned}$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2017] Costello et al. key compression:

Alice



$j(E_{A,B})$   
 ~~$a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2$~~



Bob



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Further compression

- After recovering  $\phi(P), \phi(Q)$ , Bob computes the kernel

$$K = \langle \phi(P) + s_B \phi(Q) \rangle$$

$$= \langle a_1 + s_B b_1 \rangle R_1 + \langle a_2 + s_B b_1 \rangle R_2$$

- wlog. assume  $a_1$  is invertible  $\text{mod } 3^n$  (otherwise  $b_1$  is), then

$$a_1^{-1}K = \langle (1 + s_B b_1 a_1^{-1}) R_1 + (a_2 a_1^{-1} + s_B b_2 a_1^{-1}) R_2 \rangle = K$$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- [2017] Costello et al.'s key compression:

Alice



Bob



$\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in (\mathbb{Z}_{3^n})^3$ :  **$3/2 \log p$**  bits

$$E/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E$$

3 elements in  $\mathbb{Z}_{3^n}$  are enough:

$$\alpha = b_1 a_1^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{3^n}$$

$$\beta = a_2 a_1^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{3^n}$$

$$\gamma = b_2 a_1^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{3^n}$$

Plus 1 bit about invertibility of  $a_1$  or  $b_1$

# SIDH Public Key Compression

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Bob



$$E/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

$$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E$$

Optimizations on steps 1, 2 and 3 of compression and on decompression.

To compress  $\phi(P), \phi(Q)$ :

- generate basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$
- compute 5 pairings
  - NB: cost of 5-way Monty Inv.: 30 muls (report)
- compute 4 DLOGs, i.e.,  $\{a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2\}$
- compute  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$  from the quadruple above

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- 2017, Costello et al.'s key compression:

Alice



$j(E) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ :  **$2 \log p$**  bits  
 $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in (\mathbb{Z}_{3^n})^3$ :  **$3/2 \log p$**  bits



Bob



$E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$

$\phi(P), \phi(Q) \in E$

Public key size:  **$3.5 \log p$**  bits

- Ex.:  $|pk| = 328$  bytes for  $|p| = 751$  bits

Compression time  $\approx 1 \times$  KEX and decompression  $\approx 0.4 \times$  KEX



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- Current state of classical elliptic curves:
  - CHES'2017\*: speed records for ECDH on embedded devices using curve FourQ.
    - Compression = free (similar to original SIDH, send one coordinate of the point)
    - Decompression = 0.04x key agreement

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    - Compression = free (similar to original SIDH, send one coordinate of the point)
    - Decompression = 0.04x key agreement
- This work's goal is reduce this gap
  - Detect and improve the remaining SIDH key compression bottlenecks.

# Faster SIDH Public Key Compression

- Most costly operations:
  - I. Computing a basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$
  - II. Computing 5 pairings
  - III. Computing 4 discrete logs

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# Faster SIDH Public Key Compression

- Most costly operations:
  - I. Computing a basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$
  - II. Computing 5 pairings
  - III. Computing 4 discrete logs
- New algorithms to address the above bottlenecks.
  - Reverse basis decomposition
    - Pairings reduced to 4 instead of 5 for both sides.
    - 2 multiplications by large cofactor  $3^n$  saved in the binary case.
    - Allows for faster discrete logs.: precompute (single, shared) table offline.

# Reverse basis decomposition

- Previous works express the public key as

$$\phi(P) = a_1R_1 + a_2R_2$$

$$\phi(Q) = b_1R_1 + b_2R_2$$

- or in matrix notation

$$\begin{bmatrix} \phi(P) \\ \phi(Q) \end{bmatrix} = \overbrace{\begin{bmatrix} a_1 & a_2 \\ b_1 & b_2 \end{bmatrix}}^{M_{2 \times 2}} \begin{bmatrix} R_1 \\ R_2 \end{bmatrix}$$

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- Since  $\{\phi(P), \phi(Q)\}$  also form a basis, matrix  $M$  is invertible and changing roles:

$$\begin{bmatrix} R_1 \\ R_2 \end{bmatrix} = \overbrace{\begin{bmatrix} c_1 & c_2 \\ d_1 & d_2 \end{bmatrix}}^{M^{-1}} \begin{bmatrix} \phi(P) \\ \phi(Q) \end{bmatrix}$$

- **Idea:** revert the process by starting from  $M^{-1}$  and recovering  $M$  from it?

# Reverse basis decomposition

- Express  $\{R_1, R_2\}$  in basis  $\{\phi(P), \phi(Q)\}$

$$R_1 = c_1\phi(P) + c_2\phi(Q)$$

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$$e(\phi(P), R_1) =$$

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$$e(\phi(P), R_1) = e(\phi(P), c_1\phi(P) + c_2\phi(Q))$$

$$= e(\phi(P), c_1\phi(P)) \cdot e(\phi(P), c_2\phi(Q))$$

$$= e(\phi(P), \phi(P))^{c_1} \cdot e(\phi(P), \phi(Q))^{c_2}$$

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$$h = e(\phi(P), \phi(Q))$$

$$= e(P, \hat{\phi} \circ \phi(Q))$$

$h$  ←

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$h$  only depends on public information  $(P, Q, \deg \phi)$ , thus can be precomputed once and for all and made available in the public parameters.

# Reverse basis decomposition

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$h = e(\phi(P), \phi(Q)) \rightarrow$  fixed in the public params

$$h_0 = e(\phi(P), R_1)$$

$$h_1 = e(\phi(P), R_2)$$

$$h_2 = e(\phi(Q), R_1)$$

$$h_3 = e(\phi(Q), R_2)$$

} 4 pairings computed at runtime  
(NB: cost of 4-way Monty inv.: 12 muls)

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$$\mathbf{h}_2 = \mathbf{e}(\phi(Q), R_1)$$

$$\mathbf{h}_3 = \mathbf{e}(\phi(Q), R_2)$$

4 pairings computed  
at runtime

(NB: cost of 4-way Monty inv.:  
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$$c_1, c_2, d_1, d_2 = \log_{\mathbf{h}}\{\mathbf{h}_0, \mathbf{h}_1, \mathbf{h}_2, \mathbf{h}_3\} \text{ } \} \text{ recover } M^{-1}$$

# Reverse basis decomposition

- Reverting to  $M = (M^{-1})^{-1}$ , i.e., recover  $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2$ :

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{a}_1 & \mathbf{a}_2 \\ \mathbf{b}_1 & \mathbf{b}_2 \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{\Delta} \begin{bmatrix} d_2 & -d_1 \\ -c_2 & c_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $\Delta = \det M^{-1} = c_1 d_2 - c_2 d_1 \pmod{\ell^e}$

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where  $\Delta = \det M^{-1} = c_1 d_2 - c_2 d_1 \pmod{\ell^e}$

- But Alice only sends (assuming  $a_1$  invertible):

$$\alpha = b_1 a_1^{-1}$$

$$\beta = a_2 a_1^{-1}$$

$$\gamma = b_2 a_1^{-1}$$

# Reverse basis decomposition

- Reverting to  $M = (M^{-1})^{-1}$ , i.e., recover  $\mathbf{a}_1, \mathbf{a}_2, \mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2$ :

$$\begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{a}_1 & \mathbf{a}_2 \\ \mathbf{b}_1 & \mathbf{b}_2 \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{\Delta} \begin{bmatrix} d_2 & -d_1 \\ -c_2 & c_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $\Delta = \det M^{-1} = c_1 d_2 - c_2 d_1 \pmod{\ell^e}$

- But Alice only sends (assuming  $a_1$  invertible):

$$\alpha = -\frac{c_2}{\Delta} \cdot \frac{\Delta}{d_2} = -\frac{c_2}{d_2}$$

$$\beta = -\frac{d_1}{\Delta} \cdot \frac{\Delta}{d_2} = -\frac{d_1}{d_2}$$

$$\gamma = \frac{c_1}{\Delta} \cdot \frac{\Delta}{d_2} = \frac{c_1}{d_2}$$

1 inv. + 3 mults. ( $\pmod{\ell^e}$ )  
Same operations as before

# Reverse basis decomposition

- Swapped (reduced) Tate pairing arguments

$$h_0 = e(\phi(P), R_1)$$

$$h_1 = e(\phi(P), R_2)$$

$$h_2 = e(\phi(Q), R_1)$$

$$h_3 = e(\phi(Q), R_2)$$

# Reverse basis decomposition

- Swapped (reduced) Tate pairing arguments
- Second argument do not need to be cofactor reduced

$$h_0 = e(\phi(P), R'_1)$$

$$h_1 = e(\phi(P), R'_2)$$

$$h_2 = e(\phi(Q), R'_1)$$

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such that  $[h]R'_i = R_i$

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$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \mathbf{R}'_1 = \mathbf{c}'_1\phi(P) + \mathbf{c}'_2\phi(Q) \\ \mathbf{R}'_2 = \mathbf{d}'_1\phi(P) + \mathbf{d}'_2\phi(Q) \\ \text{s.t. } [h]\mathbf{c}'_i = \mathbf{c}_i, [h]\mathbf{d}'_i = \mathbf{d}_i \end{array} \right\} \begin{array}{l} \text{DLOGs are up to cofactor } h^{-1} \\ \text{Simply post-multiply by } h \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_{\rho e} \end{array}$$

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- Two scalar muls. by  $3^n$  saved in the binary torsion using Entangled Basis.

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- Most costly operations:

- I. Computing a basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$
- II. Computing 5 pairings
- III. Computing 4 discrete logs

- New algorithms to address the above bottlenecks.

- I. Entangled basis for the (Alice) binary  $2^m$ -torsion

Idea: generate a candidate basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$  by “subverting Elligator 2” formulas

# “Entangled” basis generation

- Elligator 2 in a nutshell:

- Montgomery curve:  $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$

- Let  $u \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  be a non-square.

- Define  $v := 1/(1 + ur^2)$  where  $r \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ .

- [Thm. Bernstein et al.] If  $u$  is a non-square, then exactly one of

$$x = -Av$$

or

$$x = Av - A$$

is the abscissa of a point on  $E$ .

# “Entangled” basis generation

- Recall: to build a basis for  $E[2^m]$  we need two full order L.I. points
- Getting points of order  $2^m$  on Montgomery curves is cheaper using the 2-descent:
  - A point  $(x, y)$  is not in the image of  $[2]E$  iff  $x$  is a non-square.
- Search only for non-square abscissas.

# “Entangled” basis generation

- The entangled basis for  $E[2^m]$ :

- Montgomery curve:  $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$

- Let  $u \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$  be a ~~non~~-square where  $u = u_0^2$  for  $u_0 \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \setminus \mathbb{F}_p$ .

- Define 2 tables  $T_s, T_n$  of pairs  $(r, v := \frac{1}{1+ur^2})$  that contain only  $v$  squares and non-squares, respectively, and  $r \in \mathbb{F}_p$ .

- If  $A$  is square we pick candidates  $v$  from  $T_n$  such that  $x = -Av$  is non-square and pick  $v$  from  $T_s$  otherwise.

- **Theorem:** choosing the parameters as above, the points whose abscissas are

$$x = -Av \quad \text{and} \quad x = Av - A$$

are either both not on  $E$  or both on  $E$ , of order multiple of  $2^m$  and linear independent.

# Faster Basis Generation

- Entangled Basis  $E[2^m] = \langle [3^n]S_1, [3^n]S_2 \rangle$ 
  - Find one basis point and the other is for free!
  - Two cofactor multiplications by  $3^n$  saved on compression!
    - Recall Bob can compute  $e_{2^n}(\phi(*), R'_i)$  and still compress his key
  - No L.I. test required!
    - Previous works remove cofactors  $3^n$  and multiply both candidate points by  $2^{m-1}$ .
  - Theoretical estimates and practical experiments show a 15× (!) speedup

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- Most costly operations:

- I. Computing a basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$
- II. Computing 5 pairings
- III. Computing 4 discrete logs

- New algorithms to address the three above bottlenecks.

- In addition to the reduction in number of pairings we investigated the plain Tate pairing over Weierstrass form with Jacobian coordinates and notice a faster pairing computation than Costello *et al.*'s version based on Montgomery-like formulas.
- No need to store numerators and denominators separately due to (partial) denominator elimination.
- Improvement of about 28% for binary and 22% for ternary pairings.

# SIDH Public Key Compression

- Most costly operations:

- I. Computing a basis  $\{R_1, R_2\}$
- II. Computing 5 pairings
- III. Computing 4 discrete logs

- New algorithms to address the three above bottlenecks.

- III. An optimal strategy for Pohlig-Hellman


- Inspired by Shoup's RDL method
- Adopts Jao-De Feo-Plût's isogeny computation to obtain optimal strategy
- Attain  $O(\ell g e)$  complexity which was informally conjectured by Shoup
- Combination is non-trivial (more improvements for DL than are possible for isogeny computation)

# Discrete log and optimal strategy

$$c \in \mu_{\ell^e}$$

$$c = g^{d_0 + d_1 \ell + \dots + d_{e-1} \ell^{e-1}}$$

$$g = e_{\ell^e}(P, Q)^{\deg \phi}$$




# Discrete log and optimal strategy

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Going to the left raises to the  $\ell$




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Element of order  $\ell$ , thus  $c^{\ell^{e-1}} = g^{d_0}$  (by Pohlig-Hellman we can recover all  $d_i$ )


Recover small discrete log. using brute force  $d_0 = \log_{g^{\ell^{e-1}}} c^{\ell^{e-1}}$

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Element of order  $\ell$ , thus  $c^{\ell^{e-1}} = g^{d_0}$  (by Pohlig-Hellman we can recover all  $d_i$ )

Recover small discrete log. using brute force  $d_0 = \log_{g^{\ell^{e-1}}} c^{\ell^{e-1}}$

$g$  is fixed, use the powers  $g^{0\ell^{e-1}}, g^{1\ell^{e-1}}, \dots, g^{(\ell-1)\ell^{e-1}}$  (due to RBD),

so only comparisons are done in the loop instead of exponentiations.


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


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
Constant cost:  $1M$  + negation  
(inversion is just a conjugation in  $\mu_{\ell^e}$ )

# Discrete log and optimal strategy

$$c \in \mu_{\ell^e}$$

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
- This problem reminds exactly the computation of  $\ell^e$ -degree isogenies.
  - Use Jao-De Feo-Plut algorithm to compute optimal strategy in  $O(e \lg e)$

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
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  - Use Jao-De Feo-Plut algorithm to compute optimal strategy in  $O(e \lg e)$
- Side-product: generate opt-strategy from  $O(e^2)$  to  $O(e \log e)$ 
  - One could compute the strategy “on-the-fly”

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- This problem reminds exactly the computation of  $\ell^e$ -degree isogenies.
  - Use Jao-De Feo-Plut algorithm to compute optimal strategy in  $O(e \lg e)$
- Side-product: generate opt-strategy from  $O(e^2)$  to  $O(e \log e)$ 
  - One could compute the strategy "on-the-fly"
- Possible to use windowed-DL to recover  $d_i \bmod \ell^w$  at each leaf.

# Discrete log and optimal strategy

Table 3: Discrete logarithm computation costs (assuming  $s \approx 0.8\mathbf{m}$ )

group	Costello <i>et al.</i> [5]	ours, $w = 1$ (ratio)	ours, $w = 3$ (ratio)	ours, $w = 6$ (ratio)
$\mu_{2^{372}}$	8271.6m	4958.4m (0.60)	3127.9m (0.39)	2103.7m (0.25)
$\mu_{3^{239}}$	7999.2m	4507.6m (0.56)	2638.1m (0.33)	1739.8m (0.22)

Binary discrete logs:  $1.7\times$ – $4\times$  faster

Ternary discrete logs:  $1.8\times$ – $4.6\times$  faster

# Implementation

- No need for isochronous methods (only public information involved).
- C implementation available on GitHub (fork of MSR PQCrypto-SIDH)

Table 4: Benchmarks in cycles on an Intel Core i5 clocked at 2.9 GHz (clang compiler with `-O3` flag, and  $s = m$  in this implementation).

operations	$2^m$ -torsion ( $w = 2$ )			$3^n$ -torsion ( $w = 1$ )		
	SIDH v2.0 [5]	ours	ratio	SIDH v2.0 [5]	ours	ratio
basis generation	24497344	1690452	14.49	20632876	17930437	1.15
discrete log.	6206319	2776568	2.24	4710245	3069234	1.53
pairing phase	33853114	25755714	1.31	39970384	30763841	1.30
compression	78952537	38755681	2.04	78919488	61768917	1.28
decompression	30057506	9990949	3.01	25809348	23667913	1.09

- Binary torsion
  - Compression time reduced by 2x. Expect  $> 3x$  using larger  $w$ .
  - Decompression time reduced by 3x

# Implementation

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- Ternary torsion
  - Compression 1.3x speedup. Expect  $> 2x$  using larger  $w$
  - Decompression time reduced by 1.1x. (new improvements will be available soon)

# Summary

- Improvements in all compression bottlenecks
- Publicly source code on top of the well-known SIDH library
- Other results:
  - Faster point tripling:  $5M+6S$  instead of  $6M+5S$  by Rao *et al*
  - Slightly faster 3-torsion basis generation
- Future work:
  - Generalize entangled basis for non-binary torsions  
(seems hard)
  - Improve the new bottleneck (pairings)

# Questions?

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Questions?

Thanks!

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# SIDH Public Key Compression

## Appendix



# IMPROVED POINT TRIPLING

# Point tripling

- New  $xz$ -only tripling algorithm for the Montgomery curve  $E : By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$ .
- Cost:  $5\mathbf{M} + 6\mathbf{S} + 9\mathbf{A}$  (counting any left shift as an addition).
- Best previous algorithm in the literature (by S. R. S. Rao) only attains  $6\mathbf{M} + 5\mathbf{S} + 7\mathbf{A}$ .
- Given  $(x, z)$ , compute  $(x_3, z_3) = 3 \cdot (x, z)$ :
  - $t_1 \leftarrow x^2, t_2 \leftarrow z^2, t_3 \leftarrow (t_1 - t_2)^2,$
  - $t_5 \leftarrow t_1 + t_2, t_4 \leftarrow (x + z)^2 - t_5,$
  - $t_4 \leftarrow t_3 \cdot (A/2), t_5 \leftarrow 4t_2, t_6 \leftarrow 4t_1,$
  - $t_4 \leftarrow t_4 + t_5, t_7 \leftarrow t_4 \cdot t_5, t_8 \leftarrow t_4 \cdot t_6,$
  - $t_1 \leftarrow (t_3 - t_7)^2, t_2 \leftarrow (t_3 - t_8)^2,$
  - $x_3 \leftarrow x \cdot t_1, z_3 \leftarrow z \cdot t_2.$



# ENTANGLED BASIS

# Faster Basis Generation

- Entangled Basis generation for  $E[2^m]$ 
  - 2-descent used to get points of full order  $2^m$ .
    - 2-descent: given  $E/F_q: y^2 = (x - \alpha_1)(x - \alpha_2)(x - \alpha_3)$ , then a point  $(x', y') \in 2E$  iff  $x' - \alpha_1, x' - \alpha_2, x' - \alpha_3$  are all squares in  $F_q$ .
    - Corollary: for a Montgomery curve  $E_M/F_{p^2}: By^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1)$ , a point  $(x', y') \notin 2E$  iff  $x'$  is non-square in  $F_{p^2}$ .
    - Therefore, in order to find full order  $2^m$  points, run through candidates (precomputed table of non-squares) where  $x'$  is non-square.

# “Entangled” basis generation

- Entangled algorithm( $A, u_0, u$ ):

- test  $A =: a + bi$  :  
     $z \leftarrow a^2 + b^2$   
     $s \leftarrow z^{(p+1)/4}$   
    check  $s^2 = z$

} Test  $A$  quadraticity and  
select  $T \leftarrow T_s$  (or  $T_n$ )

- repeat //  $k$  times  
    lookup next entry  $(r, v = 1/(1 + ur^2))$  from  $T$   
     $x \leftarrow -A \cdot v$  // (NB:  $x$  nonsquare)  
     $t \leftarrow x \cdot (x^2 + A \cdot x + 1)$   
    test  $t =: c + di$  quadraticity:  
     $z \leftarrow c^2 + d^2$   
     $s \leftarrow z^{(p+1)/4}$   
    until  $s^2 = z$
- compute  $y \leftarrow \sqrt{x^3 + A \cdot x^2 + x}$  :  
     $z \leftarrow (c + s)/2$   
     $\alpha \leftarrow z^{(p+1)/4}$   
     $\beta \leftarrow d \cdot (2\alpha)^{-1}$   
     $y \leftarrow (\alpha^2 = z) ? \alpha + \beta i : -\beta + \alpha i$
- compute basis:  
     $S_1 \leftarrow (x, y), S_2 \leftarrow (ur^2x, u_0ry)$  // low cost for small  $r$

# “Entangled” basis generation

- Entangled algorithm( $A, u_0, u$ ):

- test  $A =: a + bi$  :

$$z \leftarrow a^2 + b^2$$

$$s \leftarrow z^{(p+1)/4}$$

check  $s^2 = z$

Test  $A$  quadraticity and  
select  $T \leftarrow T_s$  (or  $T_n$ )

- repeat //  $k$  times

lookup next entry  $(r, v = \mathbf{1}/(\mathbf{1} + ur^2))$  from  $T$  //free

$$x \leftarrow -A \cdot v \text{ // (NB: } x \text{ nonsquare)}$$

$$t \leftarrow x \cdot (x^2 + A \cdot x + \mathbf{1})$$

test  $t =: c + di$  quadraticity:

$$z \leftarrow c^2 + d^2$$

$$s \leftarrow z^{(p+1)/4}$$

until  $s^2 = z$

Find first candidate  
on  $E$

- compute  $y \leftarrow \sqrt{x^3 + A \cdot x^2 + x}$  :

$$z \leftarrow (c + s)/2$$

$$\alpha \leftarrow z^{(p+1)/4}$$

$$\beta \leftarrow d \cdot (2\alpha)^{-1}$$

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- compute basis:

$$S_1 \leftarrow (x, y), S_2 \leftarrow (ur^2x, u_0ry) \text{ // low cost for small } r$$

# “Entangled” basis generation

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Test  $A$  quadraticity and  
select  $T \leftarrow T_s$  (or  $T_n$ )

Find first candidate  
on  $E$

Recover  $y$  of first  
candidate on  $E$

# “Entangled” basis generation

- Entangled algorithm( $A, u_0, u$ ):

- test  $A =: a + bi$  :
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  - $z \leftarrow (c + s)/2$
  - $\alpha \leftarrow z^{(p+1)/4}$
  - $\beta \leftarrow d \cdot (2\alpha)^{-1}$
  - $y \leftarrow (\alpha^2 = z) ? \alpha + \beta i : -\beta + \alpha i$
- compute basis:
  - $S_1 \leftarrow (x, y), S_2 \leftarrow (ur^2x, u_0ry)$  // low cost for small  $r$

Test  $A$  quadraticity and select  $T \leftarrow T_s$  (or  $T_n$ )

Find first candidate on  $E$

Recover  $y$  of first candidate on  $E$

Second candidate